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Recent research has examined how often mind-wandering occurs about past vs.
future events. However, mind-wandering may also be atemporal, although previous
investigations of this possibility have not yielded consistent results. Indeed, it is
unclear what proportion of mind-wandering is atemporal, and also how an atemporal
response option would affect the future-oriented bias often reported during low-demand
tasks used to measure mind-wandering. The present study examined self-reported
(Experiment 1) and probe-caught (Experiment 2) mind-wandering using the low-demand
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) in younger (18–30) and older (50–73) adults
in an experimental paradigm developed to measure mind-wandering using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Mturk). Across self-reported and probe-caught mind-wandering, the
atemporal response option was used at least as frequently as past or future mind-
wandering options. Although older adults reported far fewer mind-wandering events, they
showed a very similar temporal pattern to younger adults. Most importantly, inclusion of
the atemporal report option affected performance on the SART and selectively eliminated
the prospective bias in self-reported mind-wandering, but not in probe-caught mind-
wandering. These results suggest that both young and older participants are often not
thinking of past or future events when mind-wandering, but are thinking of events that
cannot easily be categorized as either.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent investigations into mind-wandering have revealed that
off-task thoughts are frequent (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010), resource-demanding (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Smallwood, 2010; although see McVay and Kane, 2010), asso-
ciated with negative mood (Smallwood et al., 2007b, 2009a;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and are often disruptive in the
face of a competing, ongoing task (Smallwood et al., 2004; Kane
et al., 2007; Cheyne et al., 2009;McVay and Kane, 2009). Although
there is some controversy regarding whether it is the sponta-
neous generation of task-unrelated thought, or attention to such
thought, that requires cognitive resources (see McVay and Kane,
2010; Smallwood, 2010, for a recent discussion of this issue),
it appears that mind-wandering involves a complex interplay of
self-referential and executive processes.
Given the self-referential nature of mind-wandering (Spreng
et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011b), it is reasonable to ask: what
does one think about when the mind wanders? Does one tend
to think about the future or the past? Although mind-wandering
was directly explored as early as the middle of the 20th century
(Edmiston and Braddock, 1941; Cohen et al., 1956; Antrobus
et al., 1964), and has been the focus of considerable work within
the past decade (see Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Schooler
et al., 2011, for reviews), researchers have only recently begun
to investigate the contents and direction of off-task thoughts.
Through careful study of where the mind goes while it wanders,
one may develop a better understanding of why mind-wandering
occurs.
One emerging area of research focuses on variables that influ-
ence the temporal aspect of mind-wandering (Smallwood et al.,
2009b, 2011a,b; Baird et al., 2011). Initial investigations have
addressed the effects of cognitive load, interest, and familiarity
on the temporal focus of mind-wandering episodes. For exam-
ple, Smallwood et al. (2009b) found that when performing tasks
low in cognitive demand, such as passive viewing of digits or
a choice reaction time (RT) task, participants tended to think
about the future as opposed to the past when mind-wandering.
Similarly, Smallwood et al. found that in a reading task, prospec-
tive mind-wandering decreased for relatively familiar and inter-
esting topics. Additionally, they found that the prospective bias
in mind-wandering, and mind-wandering in general, decreased
as task demands increased. Participants completing a relatively
demanding working memory task tended to think about the
past and future at similar rates, as opposed to the prospective
bias observed during passive digit viewing. These data suggest a
penchant for thinking about the future whenever an individual
is disengaged from an ongoing task (also see Smallwood et al.,
2011a).
Work by Stawarczyk et al. (2011, 2013) expanded upon the
Smallwood et al. (2009b) paradigm, differentiating among several
varieties of task-unrelated thought. Stimulus-independent task-
unrelated thoughts, which may be understood as a relatively pure
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measure of mind-wandering, were distinguished from externally-
driven distractions as well as task-related interference, a type
of task-relevant thought not directly involved with successful
task execution. Analyses of detailed mind-wandering reports
also revealed a prospective bias, extending results reported by
Smallwood et al. (2009b, 2011a,b; Baird et al., 2011) as well
as Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010). Taken together, across several
variations in the assessment of temporal focus during mind-
wandering, a clear tendency has emerged for participants to
report thinking about the future.
Prospective mind-wandering may be related to episodic future
thought (EFT), or “the ability to mentally simulate hypothetical
scenarios,” (Szpunar, 2010, p. 142), given that individuals often
think about personal goals while mind-wandering (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006). Like future-oriented mind-wandering, it
appears that EFTs may be associated with the availability of
cognitive resources, perhaps working memory (Szpunar et al.,
2007; Schacter et al., 2008). Indeed, in a meta-analysis Spreng
et al. (2009) reported a large degree of overlap among the func-
tional resting-state neural networks underlying autobiograph-
ical memory and off-task thought, suggesting that EFTs and
mind-wandering may arise from similar neurobiological sub-
strates. Moreover, recent work has demonstrated a link between
autobiographical processes and future focus in mind-wandering.
Results reported by Smallwood et al. (2011b) showed that a brief
period of self-reflection increased the likelihood of reporting
future-oriented mind-wandering. Recently, Finnbogadóttir and
Berntsen (2013) investigated involuntary thoughts (a proxy for
mind-wandering) about the past and the future using a diary
method, and found that the two occurred equally often and
were extremely highly correlated in terms of frequency. Standard
mind-wandering paradigms, such at the Sustained Attention
to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood
et al., 2004) used in the present study, may provide a more
focused approach to augment scientific understanding of tempo-
ral thought during mind-wandering.
The primary goal of our study was to investigate whether the
temporal focus reported in mind-wandering paradigms may be
due in part to the response options available to the participant.
In particular, we investigated the report of mind-wandering in
absence of a specific temporal focus; that is, atemporal mind-
wandering. Previous research has included atemporal mind-
wandering response options, but frequently these reports are
excluded from formal analyses (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Song and Wang, 2012),
or atemporal mind-wandering is combined with other mea-
sures of on-task or off-task thought (Smallwood et al., 2009b;
Stawarczyk et al., 2013) to better power examination of the
prospective focus that is typically emphasized in these studies.
Interestingly, definitions of atemporal focus have been incon-
sistent in the extant literature. Some studies have included in
atemporal reports additional thought types such as audiovisual
distractions from the current environment or thoughts related
to task performance but not task execution, or have not been
clear on the inclusion of these categories (Smallwood et al.,
2009b, 2011a,b; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011).
However, environmental distractions are externally-driven, and
not necessarily informative with regard to mind-wandering pro-
cesses (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Additionally, distracting thoughts
related to task performance, known as task-related interference,
are not well understood, and are inconsistently classified as
on-task thought, mind-wandering, or something else altogether
(McVay and Kane, 2009; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al.,
2011, 2013; Maillet and Rajah, 2013; McVay et al., 2013). Here,
we consider temporal focus only for mind-wandering reports, or
stimulus-independent, task-unrelated thoughts.
To illustrate what we mean by atemporal mind-wandering,
we present the following example. An individual may find one-
self thinking about groceries purchased last week, groceries to
be purchased in the coming week, or something more difficult
to temporally categorize, such as the thought, “I need gro-
ceries.” Although such thoughts may be branded as prospective
or retrospective, this may occur through additional considera-
tion (using the example above, the participant might decide that
this is prospective mind-wandering since the groceries have not
yet been purchased), but this resolution removes the individual
from the psychological present, a critical aspect of experience-
sampling methods. Under current paradigms, particularly judg-
ments of temporal focus in mind-wandering not made in an
on-line fashion (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al.,
2011), participants may arbitrarily bin an atemporal thought as
past- or future-focused, or they may selectively endorse one tem-
poral epoch over another. In either case, the role of atemporal
focus in mind-wandering must be addressed to fully understand
the prospective bias often observed. In addition, the wording
of the “task/here and now” option used by Smallwood et al.
(2009b) suggests the assumption that thinking about the “here
and now” (e.g., about the temperature of the room) is equiv-
alent to task-related thought, which conflates on-task thought
with stimulus-independent thought occurring in the present. It
is possible that subtle aspects of task wording may dramatically
influence how participants report off-task thought. The current
design sought to investigate this possibility through the separa-
tion of “task/here and now” used in Smallwood et al. (2009b)
into two separate types of thought report. In order to investigate
the presence of an atemporal mind-wandering option on the fre-
quency of reporting past and future thoughts, in the present study
we assigned participants to conditions that included or omit-
ted an atemporal-report option for mind-wandering, along with
past- and future-report options.
In the present study, we also investigated both self-caught
and probe-caught measures of temporal bias, because these two
methods of mind-wandering may differ in the relative amount
of meta-awareness needed to report off-task thought (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood et al., 2007a; Schooler et al.,
2011). In particular, the self-caught method reflects relatively
late detection of mind-wandering due to the necessity of online
self-monitoring, whereas the probe-caught method allows for
earlier detection since participants do not have to be aware of
mind-wandering until they are asked to report it. Indeed, com-
parisons of self- and probe-caught measures demonstrate that
not all mind-wandering rises to the level of conscious aware-
ness (Finnigan et al., 2007; Sayette et al., 2009). Specifically,
when young adults were under the influence of alcohol, they
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 742 | 2
Jackson et al. Atemporal focus in mind-wandering
reported twice as much probe-caught off-task thought as sober
controls, but the groups did not differ in self-reported mind-
wandering. This suggests that while the two methods are com-
plementary, they are not isomorphic (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006), and although there are no appreciable changes in per-
formance when self-monitoring of mind-wandering is required
(Schooler et al., 2004), later selection of mind-wandering (as
reflected by self-caught mind-wandering) may produce richer,
more temporally-specified mind-wandering.
In addition to investigating atemporal mind-wandering, in
this study we also investigated whether there are age-related
changes with respect to mind-wandering and temporal focus.
Studies investigating aging and mind-wandering are somewhat
limited. Jackson and Balota (2012) recently reported evidence
that older adults, compared to younger adults, produced less
mind-wandering in three versions of the SART and in a reading
task. Older adults were also disproportionately slowed after No-
Go errors relative to younger adults, which has been viewed as
reflecting a re-engagement of task set that may or may not serve
as an indicator of mind-wandering (Cheyne et al., 2009; McVay
et al., 2013). Work by Maillet and Rajah (2013) and McVay et al.
(2013) has investigated the impact of aging on reports of mind-
wandering as well as task-related interference. Both articles find
age-related reductions in reported mind-wandering, although
they differ with respect to age differences in task-related interfer-
ence. Vigilance paradigms, in which participants must respond
to a rarely-presented target, have also produced evidence of less
mind-wandering in older adults compared to younger adults
(Giambra, 1989; Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–1991; although
see Einstein and McDaniel, 1997). Questionnaire-based inves-
tigations of mind-wandering and aging have similarly found a
reduction in off-task thought with age (Singer and McCraven,
1961; Giambra, 1973, 2000), although with the involuntary mem-
ory paradigm, a clear age effect is not observed (Rubin and
Berntsen, 2009).
To our knowledge, no studies have examined the intersection
of temporal focus, mind-wandering, and aging. It is possible that
age-related trends in temporally-focused mind-wandering may
be similar to temporal focus in episodic memory. Both Addis et al.
(2008) and Rendell et al. (2012) reported worse performance by
older adults across several quality dimensions for temporal events
both in the past and in the future (see also Addis et al., 2010).
Given that older adults report less mind-wandering (Grodsky and
Giambra, 1990–1991; Giambra, 2000; Jackson and Balota, 2012),
and that older adults produce fewer details in future and retro-
spective episodic thought, it is possible that the two patterns are
linked. Specifically, older adults may not report as much temporal
mind-wandering as younger adults, because they are less likely to
access past and future episodic details.
In summary, previous work on the temporal focus of mind-
wandering is unclear with respect to the nature of atem-
poral mind-wandering. In addition, we are unaware of any
studies of temporal mind-wandering that have included a
comparison across young and older adults, even though one
might predict age-related differences such that older adults
would report relatively fewer temporally-based mind-wandering
events. Therefore, the present study aims to explore temporal
focus in mind-wandering as a function of availability of a
previously-unexplored atemporal response option, in two differ-
ent age groups. We employed the SART, a standard measure of
mind-wandering, using both a self-caught and a probe-caught
paradigm to further evaluate methodological influences in mea-
suring mind-wandering. These mind-wandering measures, along
with a set of individual-difference measures, were collected in
order to better understand the effects of response options and age
on temporal focus in two standard mind-wandering paradigms.
In particular, measures related to task engagement and per-
sonality were collected because of results obtained by Jackson
and Balota (2012), which suggested that older adults were more
engaged by the task than younger adults, and that this additional
engagement may partially account for the lower reports of mind-
wandering by this group. Older adults were also lower in self-
rated neuroticism and higher in conscientiousness in that study.
Because neuroticism captures aspects of anxiety, and conscien-
tiousness captures aspects of self-discipline (Costa and McCrae,
1992), these dimensions may also play a role in age differences in
reported mind-wandering. To further understand age differences
in task engagement, we also collected the Need for Cognition scale
(Cacioppo et al., 1984) and assessed vocabulary (Shipley, 1940)
to replicate the older adult advantage often observed in studies of
cognitive aging.
A final important aspect of the present study is to replicate the
Jackson and Balota (2012) findings of reduced mind-wandering
and greater task engagement in older than younger adults within
an online platform, given that this method allows participants to
be tested in a context of their own choosing, rather than in a lab
setting. This difference in task environment may modulate mind-
wandering for older adults because fewer relevant concerns may
be triggered in a novel setting (Klinger, 1971, 2009; McVay and
Kane, 2010). That is, since older adults may find a lab setting at a
University relatively more novel, a laboratory environment might
selectively reduce the level of mind-wandering for older adults,
compared with younger adults. Therefore, both of our experi-
ments were conducted online, with participants choosing their
own time and location for the experiment, arguably eliminating
the novelty effect of the lab. Thus, we can further examine the
age effects found in mind-wandering in a more familiar testing
environment.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiments 1 and 2 differed in terms of whether mind-
wandering was collected by self-caught reports (Experiment 1)
or probe-caught reports (Experiment 2). We first describe the
sample identification, the task, and the mind-wandering response
options in Experiment 1. We then describe modifications that
were made for Experiment 2. Results for the two experiments are
presented together.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample identification
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Since we are not aware of any mind-wandering
experience-sampling studies that have used MTurk, we will pro-
vide some detail regarding the process here. As noted, one of the
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 742 | 3
Jackson et al. Atemporal focus in mind-wandering
goals of the present study is to insure that the results obtained in
the lab are replicated in a presumably more natural setting for this
online sample.
The MTurk website allows “requesters,” or experimenters, to
commission “workers,” or participants, for short, payable tasks
(“HITs”), or individual experiments. Requesters post HITs, which
are tasks that can be completed online, giving information on the
duration and compensation.Workers sign up to complete HITs. If
the work they submit meets criteria outlined prior to starting the
HIT, the requester approves the HIT and the worker receives the
promised sum ofmoney.MTurk is nowwidely used to collect data
for psychological research (see Crump et al., 2013, for a recent
evaluation).
No demographic information is available for workers in the
MTurk pool, except for location and HIT approval rate (i.e., what
percentage of work submitted by this worker has met requesters’
standards). Our first task was therefore to identify a suitable sam-
ple of participants. We aimed for adults aged 18–30 and 50 or
over. To identify our sample, we posted a HIT that contained 3
questions and paid 3 cents, and was only available to workers in
the US who currently had a HIT approval rate of at least 95%.
The questions in this HIT were “age,” “current occupation” (this
variable was of interest for another study), and “year of birth” (to
confirm age). To attract older participants, since older workers are
less common on MTurk, the title of the survey included the sen-
tence “Especially looking for MTurkers aged 50 or above.” Of the
1000 participants who completed this survey, 448 self-identified
as younger adults (18–30), and 380 self-identified as older adults
(50 plus). The remaining 172 participants fell between the age cat-
egories of interest, and thus were not contacted to complete the
current studies. In addition, further potential participants were
added to the pools based on the age they reported on a previous,
unrelated experiment. These pre-screening procedures resulted in
a pool of 1113 younger adults (aged 18–30) and 431 older adults
(aged 50 or above).
Participants
Two HITs were posted simultaneously on MTurk, one available
to participants in the younger adult pool and the other to par-
ticipants in the older adult pool. To encourage participation in
the experiment amongst older adults, given their lower num-
bers, e-mails were sent out to 185 eligible older adults to alert
them of the study. Participants were offered $1 to complete the
20-min HIT. At the equivalent of $3/hour, this represents a rel-
atively lucrative HIT on MTurk (see Horton and Chilton, 2010,
for an analysis of the MTurk labor market). In addition, raising
the incentive from $0.75 to $2 does little to improve data qual-
ity, instead only affecting the rate at which participants signed
up for the task (Mason and Watts, 2010; Crump et al., 2013).
Participants were told that they would only be paid if they
achieved minimal accuracy, which was set at 90% for Go trials
and 70% for No-Go trials (see Procedure), another common tech-
nique used onMTurk (see Paolacci et al., 2010, for a discussion of
the ethics behind this technique).
Recruited participants were asked their age at the start of the
experiment, and this response was used to classify participants
into the appropriate age group. Participants were not informed
that their age was a factor in their eligibility for the study, nor
were they aware of the existence of two different HITs for two
different age groups; this was done to avoid participants misrepre-
senting their age. A total of 95 younger adults and 63 older adults
were recruited; 3 further participants either did not provide their
age or did not fall into one of the two age groups of interest.
Eleven participants (5 older adults and 7 younger adults) failed
the accuracy criterion described in the paragraph above, and were
excluded from all further analyses. One additional older adult
failed to engage in the practice blocks and was excluded. This left
89 younger adults (ages 18–30) and 57 older adults (ages 50–70)
for Experiment 1, randomly assigned to either the atemporal or
no-atemporal context conditions.
Measures
The measures of interest were accuracy and RT on Go and No-Go
trials of the SART; number and type of mind-wandering probes;
and difficulty and interest ratings. In terms of demographics, in
this experiment we inquired about age and current occupation
(not reported here). Table 1 summarizes demographic informa-
tion for Experiments 1 and 2. Age did not differ within the
younger adult group [t(87) = 1.24, p = 0.22] or the older adult
group (t < 1) as a function of temporality condition.
Design
The present study is a 2× 2 quasi-experiment design. Participants
were either younger (i.e., aged 18–30), or older (i.e., aged 50 or
above) adults. In addition, on the mind-wandering report probe,
participants either chose between alternatives that included an
atemporal option in addition to past or future mind-wandering
report options (atemporal condition), or alternatives that did
not (no-atemporal condition; i.e., only past or future mind-
wandering report options). Younger and older participants were
randomly assigned to these groups. After the exclusion criteria
described above, there were 44 younger adults and 27 older adults
in the atemporal condition, and 45 younger adults and 30 older
adults in the no-atemporal condition.
Procedure
The task was completed online in one sitting. After accepting the
HIT on MTurk, participants were taken to an external website
where they accessed the experiment. The task was programmed
in Adobe Flash (ActionScript 3.0). After agreeing to consent infor-
mation, participants were taken directly to the instruction screen
for the first block of the SART.
During the SART, participants were told to press the spacebar
if they saw any digit other than a 3. Single digits 1 through 9 were
presented in white 24 pt Arial font on a black screen for 1250ms,
during which the participant response was required. There was
a 1250ms interstimulus interval, during which feedback was pre-
sented for Blocks 1 and 2 (in Blocks 3 and 4, this interval was filled
with a blank screen).
There were 3 practice blocks before the experimental block. In
the first practice block (9 trials), participants received feedback
after every trial. The word “Correct!” appeared on the screen in
green font if spacebar was pressed after any digit other than a 3,
and if spacebar was not pressed after a 3. The word “Incorrect”
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Table 1 | Demographic data and additional measures for younger and older adults.
Measure Self-caught (Experiment 1) Probe-caught (Experiment 2)
Atemporal option No atemporal option Atemporal option No atemporal option
Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older
N (female for Exp 2) 44 27 45 30 42 (19) 44 (27) 40 (22) 30 (21)
Age 25.1 (3.8)a 57.5 (5.3) 24.1 (3.1) 57.0 (6.4) 25.3 (3.1) 56.8 (5.6) 25.0 (3.2) 56.2 (4.7)
Years of education – – – – 15.1 (1.9) 15.8 (2.9) 15.7 (1.9) 14.9 (2.4)
Subjective interest 2.7 (1.0)b 2.5 (0.9)c 2.7 (1.1) 2.8 (0.5) 2.3 (1.0) 3.1 (1.1) 2.2 (1.1) 3.2 (1.3)
Subjective difficulty 2.1 (1.3)b 2.7 (1.3)c 2.0 (1.1) 2.4 (1.2) 1.8 (1.0) 2.4 (1.1) 2.0 (1.0) 2.6 (1.2)
Subjective health – – – – 3.5 (0.7) 3.4 (0.8) 3.4 (0.6) 3.3 (0.9)
Need for cognition – – – – 66.9 (13.5) 68.5 (11.4) 70.0 (9.8) 68.2 (11.6)
Shipley vocabulary – – – – 31.8 (4.4) 35.1 (2.8) 30.7 (5.1) 34.7 (3.5)
NEOd conscientiousness – – – – 46.5 (7.1) 48.5 (6.9) 45.2 (6.7) 46.1 (6.9)
NEOd neuroticism – – – – 31.3 (10.6) 26.5 (9.6) 32.6 (9.8) 31.5 (7.9)
aSD in parentheses for this and all subsequent cells.
bOne younger adult did not provide these ratings.
cOne older adult did not provide these ratings.
dNEO = NEO-FFI personality questionnaire.
appeared on the screen in red font if spacebar was pressed after
a 3, or if spacebar was not pressed after any other digit. The 9
trials of the first block were the digits 1–9 presented in the same,
randomly-generated order for all participants.
Prior to the second practice block (18 trials), participants were
instructed about the mind-wandering self-report procedure. That
is, participants were given the following instruction: “In the sec-
ond practice set, if you find yourself thinking about something
other than the task, press W to briefly report it. Afterward you
will continue on with the main digit task.”
On the next screen, participants were asked to describe their
experience with the task. The three options available on this
screen differed by condition, and followed the design reported in
the second experiment of Smallwood et al. (2009b). Participants
in the no-atemporal condition were given the following two
options: “P = I was thinking about something in the past.” or
“F = I was thinking about something in the future.” Participants
in the atemporal option condition were also given the following
third option: “H = I was thinking about something in the here
and now, or with no specific time.” Participants were encouraged
to report mind-wandering anytime they found themselves think-
ing about personal matters unrelated to the task, whether those
matters had already occurred, were yet to occur, or were ongoing.
For the 18 trials of the second block, participants continued to
receive the same feedback they had been given in the first block.
The only difference was that now participants could press W
whenever they wished to report mind-wandering. Pressing W
brought up the screen with the two (no-atemporal condition) or
three (atemporal condition) options, and participants then had
as long as needed to select the appropriate option. Once they did
so, the SART resumed with the following trial. The third block
was identical to the second except that no feedback was given on
SART trials. The 18 trials of the second and third blocks were the
digits 1–9 presented twice each, in a different random order for
each block.
The fourth block was the experimental block from which we
report all analyses, and consisted of 336 trials. The procedure for
this block was exactly the same as that of the third practice block.
The experimental block consisted of the digits 1–9 repeated in a
fixed random order, with the constraint that a minimum of 5 Go
trials were interspersed between any two No-Go trials.
After completing the SART, participants were asked how diffi-
cult and how interesting they had found the task (both on a scale
of 1–5). After responding to these questions, participants were
presented with a randomly generated code. This code had to be
entered into the Amazon HIT for participants to receive payment.
Before submitting the HIT, participants were also asked to indi-
cate their age and current occupation. For results and discussion,
Experiment 1 was combined with Experiment 2, which made use
of a probe-caught mind-wandering method.
EXPERIMENT 2
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were drawn from the same sample as Experiment 1,
without replacement. In order to exclude participants who had
already participated in Experiment 1, since there is no direct way
to do this on MTurk, we implemented three precautions. First,
participants were told in the HIT description that they would only
receive compensation for this HIT if they had not previously par-
ticipated in another HIT of the same name (“Attention Task”).
Second, the MTurk IDs of all Experiment 1 participants were
added to an array within the SART program, and when prompted
for their ID, if a match was found, participants were informed that
they were not eligible to participate. Third, after the first practice
block, participants were asked if they recognized the task, and if
so, they were told that they were not eligible to participate. To
encourage participation amongst older adults, since this pool was
considerably smaller than the younger adult pool, 168 older adults
were sent an invitation via e-mail.
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Participants were offered $2 to complete the 40-min HIT.
Participants were told that they would only be paid if they
achieved minimal accuracy, which was set at 90% for Go trials
and 70% for No-Go trials.
A total of 87 eligible younger adults and 75 eligible older adults
were recruited; 3 further participants completed the task but did
not fall into one of the two age groups of interest. Six participants
(1 older adult and 5 younger adults) failed the accuracy criterion
and were excluded from all further analyses. These exclusion cri-
teria left 82 younger adults (ages 18–30) and 74 older adults (ages
50–73) in the sample, randomly assigned to either the atemporal
or no-atemporal conditions.
Measures
In order to better characterize the sample in Experiment 2, we
collected additional demographic data on our participants, which
are summarized as a function of atemporal option and age in
Table 1. In addition to age, current occupation, subjective inter-
est and difficulty, we also asked participants to report gender,
years of education, and whether participants were native English
speakers (not reported here as all participants were either native
speakers or reported a high level of English proficiency). We also
asked participants to rate their health relative to others of a sim-
ilar age, on a scale from 1 (extremely unhealthy) to 5 (extremely
healthy). In addition, we collected data on the Need for Cognition
Scale, the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI), and the Shipley
vocabulary test (Shipley, 1940).
To assess the extent to which our participants “engage in and
enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982, p. 116), we used the
Need for Cognition Scale. The original 34-item scale was short-
ened to the current 18-item scale by Cacioppo et al. (1984). We
also added two new items to the scale: “In the past 5 years, I
am more likely to engage in activities that require a lot of think-
ing.” And “In the past 5 years, I am less likely to enjoy solving
challenging problems.” (reverse-scored).
To assess neuroticism and conscientiousness, we used the
short form of the NEO personality inventory. The NEO-FFI
(McCrae and Costa, 2004) is a 60-item scale with 12 items per
personality dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness
to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, and is
designed to take 10–15min to complete.
To assess present vocabulary, we used the Shipley vocabulary
subtest (Shipley, 1940). This is a 40-item test in which partici-
pants are given words with four possible synonyms and are asked
to pick the correct option. Table 1 summarizes scores on these
measures for older and younger participants.
To examine possible group differences in or interactions
among the demographic variables, we conducted a multivariate
analysis of variance. Age group (young or old) and atemporal
option (atemporal condition or no atemporal condition) were
included as fixed factors. The demographic data revealed an
effect of temporal condition on Neuroticism scores, such that
participants in the atemporal condition had lower scores com-
pared with participants in the no-atemporal condition, F(1, 152) =
4.13, p = .044, η2p = 0.03. Older adults found the task more
interesting, F(1, 152) = 25.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14, and more
difficult, F(1, 152) = 12.40, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.08, compared with
younger adults, replicating Jackson and Balota (2012). Older
adults also had higher Shipley vocabulary scores than younger
adults, F(1, 152) = 31.10, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17. Gender was also
examined as a function of age group and temporality condition
for Experiment 2. A Pearson chi-square was not significant, χ2 <
1, suggesting that there were no differences in gender distribu-
tion among the various conditions. No interactions of atemporal
condition and age group were significant with regard to the
demographic data, all ps > 0.05.
Design
The design of the experiment was the same 2× 2 quasi-
experimental design used in Experiment 1, in which participants
were either younger (i.e., aged 18–30), or older (i.e., aged 50 or
above) adults. The manipulated between-subjects variable was
the atemporal option condition, atemporal vs. no-atemporal.
Younger and older participants were randomly assigned to
these groups. After the exclusion criteria, described above, were
applied, there were 42 younger adults and 44 older adults in the
atemporal condition, and 40 younger adults and 30 older adults
in the no-atemporal condition.
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, participants followed a link from the Amazon
MTurk HIT to an Adobe Flash program. The experiment started
with demographic questions.
The procedure for the SART was identical to that of
Experiment 1, with the exception of the mind-wandering probes.
Instead of allowing participants to choose when to report mind-
wandering (self-caught reports), we used probe-caught reports.
That is, participants no longer pressed W to report mind-
wandering while completing the SART. Instead, participants were
stopped 14 times throughout the experimental block of the SART
and asked about their experience of the task “just now.” The
probes for the two conditions (atemporal and no-atemporal)
included the same response options as those listed in Experiment
1, plus another option: “T = I was thinking about the task.” Of
course, this refers to instances in which the individual is presum-
ably not engaged in mind-wandering. Probe trials were spaced
throughout the SART such that there were a minimum of 12
trials between probes, and 2 trials between a No-Go trial and a
probe trial. The question about subjective health, the Need for
Cognition scale, the NEO-FFI, and Shipley vocabulary test were
presented after the SART within the same Adobe Flash program.
RESULTS
ANALYTIC APPROACH
Accuracy and response latencies were submitted to a 2 (experi-
ment) × 2 (age) × 2 (atemporal option) between-participants
ANOVA. We included experiment as a factor in these analyses
because the same procedure was employed to derive the same
dependent variables in both experiments. Accuracy and response
latency data are summarized in Table 2 as a function of age
group and atemporal option condition across the two experi-
ments. In addition, as shown in Table 2, all RTs were converted
to within-subject z scores based on each participant’s mean and
standard deviation. This was done to control for age-related
slowing differences (see Faust et al., 1999).
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Table 2 | SART response latencies, Z transformed RTs and accuracy (SDs) as a function of experiment, atemporal option, and age group.
Measure Self-caught (Experiment 1) Probe-caught (Experiment 2)
Atemporal option No atemporal option Atemporal option No atemporal option
Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older
ACCURACY
Go accuracy 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 1.0 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01)
No-Go accuracy 0.91 (0.06) 0.95 (0.05) 0.90 (0.07) 0.93 (0.06) 0.91 (0.06) 0.96 (0.05) 0.91 (0.06) 0.93 (0.06)
REACTION TIME
Go RT 501 (69) 521 (63) 502 (71) 532 (82) 493 (64) 537 (81) 519 (64) 543 (77)
No-Go (Error) RT 438 (96) 408 (88) 445 (117) 423 (106) 443 (115) 422 (69) 472 (99) 453 (89)
Go zRT 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
No-Go (Error) zRT −0.58 (0.64) −0.90 (0.82) −0.45 (0.64) −0.92 (0.73) −0.47 (0.75) −0.89 (0.58) −0.47 (0.60) −0.72 (0.58)
RT refers to reaction times; zRT refers to within-subject standardized reaction times.
In contrast to the accuracy and response latency analyses,
mind-wandering reports were analyzed separately by experi-
ment because these measures differed based on whether partic-
ipants self-reported mind-wandering or were probed to report
mind-wandering. These reports were submitted to 2 (age) × 2
(atemporal option) between-participants ANOVAs. In addition, a
repeated-measures ANOVA with one independent variable (tem-
porality: past/atemporal/future) was conducted on the atemporal
condition in each experiment to examine how often each tempo-
ral option was selected. Using data from Experiment 2, we also
looked at the relationship between individual difference measures
and mind-wandering.
All results are presented after testing for unequal variances
between groups using Mauchly’s test of sphericity for analyses
of variance (ANOVA), and Levene’s test of equality for vari-
ances for t-tests. When necessary, lower-bound corrections were
used for F-tests, and unequal-variance t-tests were used in place
of Student’s t-test to compensate for unequal variance between
groups. An alpha of 0.05 was set to indicate significance.
OUTLIERS
Outlier trials on the SART were identified as response latencies
faster than 200ms or 3 SDs below the participant’s mean perfor-
mance. Outliers constituted 0.08% of all trials in Experiment 1
and 0.27% of all trials in Experiment 2, and were excluded from
principal analyses.
ACCURACY
As shown in Table 2, Go trials were more accurate than No-Go
trials, F(1, 294) = 433.54, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60. Older adults were
more accurate than younger adults, F(1, 294) = 22.81, p < 0.001
η2p = 0.07. There was a reliable interaction between age and trial
type, F(1, 294) = 26.27, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08, with a larger age
difference on No-Go trials than Go trials. Planned comparisons
revealed that although there were no age differences in Go trial
accuracy (t < 1), older adults were more accurate than younger
adults on No-Go error trials, t(300) = 5.27, p < 0.001. In addi-
tion, there was also a significant effect of the atemporal option
condition, F(1, 294) = 4.56, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.02, such that partic-
ipants who were given the atemporal option for mind-wandering
reports were more accurate on the SART.
RESPONSE LATENCIES
As shown in Table 2, participants were faster to respond to No-
Go error trials (possibly due to mind-wandering) compared with
Go trials, F(1, 246) = 203.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.45. There was
also an interaction between age and trial type, F(1, 246) = 13.54,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.05, with a greater age difference on Go tri-
als than No-Go error trials. Specifically, older adults were slower
on Go trials, t(300) = 3.67, p < 0.001, with a non-significant
trend toward older adults being faster on No-Go error trials,
t(226.96) = −1.77, p = 0.077. In addition, there was also a signif-
icant effect of the atemporal option condition, F(1, 246) = 3.88,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.02, such that participants who were given the
atemporal option for mind-wandering reports were faster on
the SART.
Under the z score transform, participants were again faster
on No-Go error trials than on Go trials, F(1, 246) = 242.82, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.50. Older adults were faster than younger adults,
F(1, 246) = 17.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, however, age interacted
with trial type, F(1, 246) = 17.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, such that
older adults were faster than younger adults only on No-Go error
trials, t(252) = 4.26, p < 0.001. No other effects or interactions
reached significance, all Fs < 1.
PRE-ERROR SPEEDING
Response latencies preceding No-Go errors tend to be faster com-
pared with those preceding correctly withheld No-Go trials, or
Go trials (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004; McVay
and Kane, 2009), presumably reflecting task disengagement or
mind-wandering. Pre-error speeding data are summarized in the
upper half of Table 3. Because there were differences between
experiments in pre-error speeding, means are presented sepa-
rately for each experiment. The four trials immediately preced-
ing a withheld No-Go response were contrasted with the four
trials immediately preceding a No-Go error in a 2 (No-Go cor-
rect vs. No-Go error) × 2 (age) × 2 (atemporal option) ×
2 (experiment) mixed-model ANOVA. Pre-error speeding was
observed, F(1, 246) = 72.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23. This was qual-
ified by an interaction between trial type and atemporal option
condition, F(1, 246) = 4.59, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.02, such that par-
ticipants without the atemporal response option exhibited greater
pre-error speeding than participants with the atemporal option,
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Table 3 | SART pre-error and post-error response latencies (SDs) as a function of trial type and age group.
Measure Self-caught (Experiment 1) Probe-caught (Experiment 2)
Atemporal option No atemporal option Atemporal option No atemporal option
Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older
PRE-ERROR SPEEDING
N − 4 No-Go error RT 485 (96) 475 (68) 469 (112) 463 (77) 481 (101) 494 (77) 469 (112) 463 (77)
N − 4 No-Go correct RT 508 (72) 503 (47) 513 (76) 529 (72) 496 (65) 526 (62) 528 (68) 544 (75)
N − 4 No-Go error zRT −0.18 (0.53) −0.24 (0.41) −0.25 (0.31) −0.54 (0.42) −0.12 (0.52) −0.28 (0.56) −0.14 (0.52) −0.22 (0.27)
N − 4 No-Go correct zRT 0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.06) 0.07 (0.09) 0.09 (0.10) 0.07 (0.09) 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.11) 0.03 (0.10)
POST-ERROR SLOWING
N + 1 No-Go error RT 518 (102) 540 (94) 517 (118) 561 (112) 513 (83) 526 (67) 527 (78) 560 (96)
N + 1 No-Go correct RT 502 (71) 489 (42) 504 (74) 511 (69) 474 (66) 507 (62) 513 (67) 519 (74)
N + 1 No-Go error zRT 0.11 (0.54) 0.41 (0.63) 0.21 (0.33) 0.41 (0.73) 0.21 (0.38) 0.05 (0.47) 0.11 (0.44) 0.16 (0.45)
N + 1 No-Go correct zRT 0.00 (0.12) −0.08 (0.10) −0.01 (0.11) −0.08 (0.10) −0.14 (0.13) −0.14 (0.12) −0.06 (0.12) −0.17 (0.15)
RT refers to reaction times; zRT refers to within-subject standardized reaction times.
t(252) = 2.20, p = 0.029. When converted to z scores, trials pre-
ceding No-Go errors were again faster than those preceding
correct No-Go trials, F(1, 246) = 94.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28.
Older adults were faster than younger adults, F(1, 246) = 6.84,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.03. These effects were qualified by an interac-
tion between trial type and age group, F(1, 246) = 5.08, p = 0.025,
η2p = 0.02, with greater pre-error speeding in older adults com-
pared with younger adults, t(252) = 2.32, p = 0.021. In addition,
there was also a trial type by experiment interaction, F(1, 246) =
4.28, p = 0.040, η2p = 0.02, such that there was a non-significant
trend towardmore pre-error speeding in Experiment 1 where par-
ticipants self-reported mind-wandering, t(252) = 1.88, p = 0.061.
POST-ERROR SLOWING
In contrast with pre-error speeding, participants tend to be
slower after a No-Go error relative to correctly withheld No-Go
responses (Laming, 1968). This post-error slowing may reflect
recovery of control after an error has been made. Post-error
slowing data are summarized in the lower half of Table 3.
Because there were differences between experiments in post-error
slowing, means are presented separately for each experiment. The
four trials immediately following a withheld No-Go response
were contrasted with the four trials immediately following a
No-Go error in a 2 (No-Go correct vs. No-Go error) × 2 (age)
× 2 (atemporal option) mixed-model ANOVA. Participants
reliably demonstrated post-error slowing F(1, 246) = 48.31,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16, although trial type interacted with age,
F(1, 246) = 5.30, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.02, whereby older adults
exhibited greater post-error slowing than younger adults,
t(252) = 2.17, p = 0.031. Standardized latencies revealed a sim-
ilar pattern, with observed post-error slowing, F(1, 246) = 71.96,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23, and a reliable interaction between trial type
and age group, F(1, 246) = 5.67, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.02, such that
older adults produced greater post-error slowing than younger
adults, t(161.54) = 2.09, p = 0.038. In addition, there was a signifi-
cant effect of experiment, F(1, 246) = 14.67, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.06,
such that participants in Experiment 2 (which made use of
probe-caught mind-wandering) were faster overall than those in
Experiment 1. There was also a reliable 2-way interaction between
experiment and age group, F(1, 246) = 5.26, p = 0.023, η2p =
0.02, and a reliable three-way interaction between experiment,
age group, and trial type, F(1, 246) = 5.63, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.02.
The three-way interaction clarified that the age× trial type inter-
action was only reliable in Experiment 1, F(1, 122) = 8.81, p =
0.004, η2p = 0.07, where post-error slowing was greater in older
adults, t(66.37) = 2.71, p = 0.008, replicating Jackson and Balota
(2012). This interaction was not reliable in Experiment 2, F < 1.
SUBJECTIVE DIFFICULTY AND INTEREST
Older adults rated the task as more difficult, F(1, 292) = 17.24,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.06, and more interesting, F(1, 292) = 12.23,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04, than younger adults, replicating Jackson
and Balota (2012), although there was also an interaction between
experiment and age group for interest ratings, F(1, 292) = 14.15,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.05, such that the age difference was only
observed in Experiment 2, t(154) = 5.06, p < 0.001, where mind-
wandering was collected by probe reports. There was no age
difference in interest in Experiment 1, t < 1. There were no group
differences as a function of atemporal option condition, Fs < 1.
MIND-WANDERING REPORTS
As noted, mind-wandering reports were analyzed separately for
Experiments 1 and 2 because of the different procedures used to
collect these data in each experiment.
Experiment 1 mind-wandering reports
We first examined whether the total number of reported mind-
wandering episodes differed as a function of age and atempo-
ral option. Older adults reported less mind-wandering (M =
2.77, SD = 5.96) than younger adults (M = 6.25, SD = 8.36),
F(1, 142) = 7.28, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.05, replicating previous age-
related mind-wandering studies (Singer and McCraven, 1961;
Giambra, 1973, 1989; Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–1991; Jackson
and Balota, 2012), but the addition of the atemporal option
did not affect the overall level of mind-wandering reports and
there was no interaction (Fs < 1). Some participants reported no
mind-wandering at all: 21% of younger adults and 51% of older
adults reported no mind-wandering.
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Figure 1A (younger adults) and Figure 1B (older adults) dis-
play past and future mind-wandering counts as a function of
the presence of the atemporal option. In order to compare past
and future mind-wandering between atemporal option condi-
tions, we submitted mind-wandering reports to a 2 (temporality:
past/future report) × 2 (age) × 2 (atemporal option) mixed
ANOVA, with past/future report as a within-subjects variable.
Older adults reported less past and future mind-wandering than
younger adults, F(1, 142) = 5.11, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.04. There was
no main effect of temporality or presence of the atemporal
response option, but there was a significant atemporal option
× temporality interaction, F(1, 142) = 5.39, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.04.
That is, there was a prospective bias when the atemporal option
was absent, t(75) = 2.23, p = 0.029; but no such prospective bias
when the atemporal option was present; indeed, the numerical
effect was in the opposite direction although this difference failed
to reach significance, t(71) = −1.28, p = 0.204.
To examine the use of the atemporal option and compare
it to temporal mind-wandering, we also conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA on mind-wandering reports only in the
atemporal option condition to examine whether the atempo-
ral option was used reliably more or less than the past and
future options, and whether this differed by age. There were
no significant differences in terms of age or response, such that
each of the three options was used equally often by both age
groups.
Mind-wandering temporality may also be analyzed as a pro-
portion of total mind-wandering. To do this, we divided the
number of past, future, and atemporal mind-wandering reports
by the total number of mind-wandering reports for each partic-
ipant. This is how probe-reported mind-wandering has typically
been analyzed with respect to temporal focus (e.g., Smallwood
et al., 2009b). However, there is a problem with this analysis
for self-reported mind-wandering. In the condition where there
was no atemporal option, the past and future proportions sum
to 1. In the atemporal option condition, the past and future
proportions do not sum to 1 if there was any atemporal mind-
wandering reported, thus creating a potentially spurious effect
of the atemporal option condition due to scaling effects. For this
reason, we examined the no-atemporal and atemporal conditions
separately for this analysis. There was an age effect in both the
no-atemporal, F(1, 69) = 5.79, p = 0.019, η2p = 0.08, and atem-
poral conditions, F(1, 73) = 14.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16, with
older adults reporting less mind-wandering. In addition, the anal-
yses corroborated our findings with respect to prospective bias
described above using raw counts: there was a prospective bias
in the no-atemporal condition, M = 0.43 (SD = 0.39) future vs.
0.26 (SD = 0.32) past, F(1, 73) = 5.97, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.08; but
no such prospective bias when the atemporal option was present
(p = 0.29).
Experiment 2 mind-wandering reports
Given the nature of the design used in Experiment 2, we were
able to analyze proportions of mind-wandering reports through-
out our mind-wandering analysis rather than using raw counts.
However, Figure 2A (younger adults), and Figure 2B (older
adults) report raw counts for ease of comparison to Experiment
1. Mind-wandering proportions in all cases were calculated as a
proportion of the total number (14) of mind-wandering probes.
We first examined whether the overall proportion of reported
mind-wandering differed as a function of age and atemporal
option condition. Older adults reported less mind-wandering
(M = 0.27, SD = 0.29) than did younger adults (M = 0.35,
SD = 0.28), F(1, 152) = 4.08, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.03, and the addi-
tion of the atemporal option increased the overall proportion
of reported mind-wandering from M = 0.25 (SD = 0.25) to
M = 0.37 (SD = 0.31), F(1, 152) = 8.20, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.05.
There were no interactions with the between-subjects variables
(Fs < 1). Some participants reported no mind-wandering at all:
16% of younger adults and 34% of older adults reported no
mind-wandering.
Figure 2A (younger adults) and Figure 2B (older adults)
summarize past and future mind-wandering counts for each
atemporal option condition, as well as proportion of atemporal
mind-wandering in the condition that was offered that option.
To compare past and future mind-wandering between atemporal
FIGURE 1 | Raw counts of past- and future-oriented mind-wandering
for younger adults (panel A) and older adults (panel B) with and
without the atemporal in Experiment 1. For participants with the
atemporal option, counts for that response option are also
shown. Error bars on all figures represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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FIGURE 2 | Proportions of past- and future-oriented mind-wandering for younger adults (panel A) and older adults (panel B) with and without the
atemporal in Experiment 2.
option conditions, we submitted mind-wandering to a 2 (tempo-
rality: past/future proportion) × 2 (age) × 2 (atemporal option)
mixed ANOVA, with past/future proportion as a within-subjects
variable. As for overall mind-wandering, older adults reported
less mind-wandering, F(1, 152) = 9.15, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.06. In
addition, there was a significant main effect of temporality,
F(1, 152) = 33.27, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18, with a prospective bias in
mind-wandering. Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no interac-
tion between temporality and the atemporal option (F < 1).
To examine the use of the atemporal option and compare
it to temporal mind-wandering, we also conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA on mind-wandering reports in the atemporal
option condition. There was a significant effect of temporal-
ity, F(2, 168) = 13.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.184 with the atemporal
option used the most often (M = 0.16, SD = 0.17), followed by
future (M = 0.15, SD = 0.20) and past (M = 0.05, SD = 0.10)
options. In addition, there was a significant age × temporality
interaction, F(2, 168) = 3.63, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.04. Post-hoc com-
parisons clarified that younger adults reported significantly fewer
instances of past-oriented mind-wandering relative to the atem-
poral orientation, t(41) = 3.08, p = 0.004, and the future orienta-
tion, t(41) = 3.47, p = 0.001, but there was no difference between
proportions of reported atemporal and future-oriented mind-
wandering, t < 1. Older adults, like younger adults, reported
fewer past-oriented mind-wandering relative to the atempo-
ral orientation, t(43) = 6.63, p < 0.001, and future orientation,
t(43) = 3.50, p = 0.001. However, older adults also reported more
atemporal mind-wandering relative to future-oriented mind-
wandering, t(43) = 2.51, p = 0.016. This pattern is displayed in
Figures 2A,B.
RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCE MEASURES
Exploratory correlational analyses were conducted to determine
whether indices of SART performance and mind-wandering
were associated with individual measures of education, health,
intellectual interest, and personality. In particular, we were
interested in why older adults seemed to be showing less
retrospective mind-wandering, a pattern that was consistent
across both experiments. Table 4 presents a correlational matrix
Table 4 | Correlational matrix for overall mind-wandering,
mind-wandering as a function of temporal focus, with age,
education, health, and neuroticism in Experiment 2.
Age Education Health Neuroticism
Overall mind-wandering
(n = 156)
−0.18 0.16 −0.06 0.11
Past-oriented
mind-wandering (n = 116)
−0.25 −0.01 −0.23 0.24
Atemporal mind-wandering
(n = 69)
0.24 0.12 0.12 0.10
Future-oriented
mind-wandering (n = 116)
−0.15 0.16 −0.05 0.09
Items in bold indicate p < 0.05. For mind-wandering with atemporal focus, only
participants who reported at least one mind-wandering episode were included
in the analyses.
for overall mind-wandering, mind-wandering as a function of
temporal focus, continuous age, education, health, and neu-
roticism. These correlations only included participants who
reported at least one episode of mind-wandering, in order
to explore the association with temporally focused mind-
wandering specifically rather than the presence or absence of
mind-wandering more generally. First, overall amount of mind-
wandering was positively correlated with education and nega-
tively correlated with age. However, when looking individually
at the mind-wandering report options, prospective mind-
wandering was not significantly correlated with any of these
measures; retrospective mind-wandering was negatively corre-
lated with age and subjective health, and positively correlated
with neuroticism; whereas atemporal mind-wandering was pos-
itively correlated with age. Additionally, independent-samples
t-tests revealed, as expected, that younger adults had higher
scores on neuroticism than older adults, t(154) = 2.18, p = 0.030.
Although older adults were overall more conscientious than
younger adults, also as expected, this difference did not reach
significance, t(154) = 1.47, p = 0.143. There was no relation-
ship between mind-wandering and conscientiousness, Need for
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Cognition, or Shipley score, although expected relationships
among Shipley, Need for Cognition, education, and age were all
positive, as one might expect based on the extant literature.
DISCUSSION
The present results yielded a number of novel findings, while
extending previous findings examining age-related changes in
mind-wandering. Although we replicated the prospective bias
seen in previous studies in the no-atemporal conditions, the
inclusion of an atemporal option eliminated the future bias
in self-reported mind-wandering, suggesting the importance of
response option when studying subtypes of mind-wandering.
Age-related effects in accuracy and RT largely replicated find-
ings reported by Jackson and Balota (2012), in particular that
older adults were more accurate on No-Go error trials, but
experienced increased pre-error speeding and disproportionate
post-error slowing compared with younger adults. Older adults
also reported less mind-wandering than did younger adults. In
line with research on temporality in episodic thought, however,
(Addis et al., 2008, 2010; Rendell et al., 2012), while older adults
were less likely to report temporally-oriented mind-wandering
overall, they nevertheless reported the same or greater propor-
tion of atemporal mind-wandering compared with past or future
mind-wandering, relative to the younger group. Our data have
implications for the temporal nature of mind-wandering and
methodological choices made in future studies that examine
this aspect of mind-wandering, as well as for the role of aging
in mind-wandering. These two issues are addressed separately
below.
MIND-WANDERING AND TEMPORAL FOCUS: METHODOLOGICAL
ISSUES IN MEASURING MIND-WANDERING
An important goal in this study was to determine the util-
ity and impact of an atemporal response option on reports of
mind-wandering. Across several studies of atemporal focus in
mind-wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009b, 2011a,b; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011, 2013;
Song andWang, 2012), a startling lack of consistency has emerged
on the assessment of atemporal focus in task-unrelated thought.
The present results demonstrate the importance of careful dif-
ferentiation of atemporal mind-wandering from other types of
mind-wandering reports. When given the opportunity, partic-
ipants in both experiments most frequently made use of the
atemporal response option relative to the past and future options.
This demonstrates that atemporal mind-wandering is a valid,
understandable construct for participants, and that its use should
be considered in forthcoming investigations of temporal mind-
wandering. Indeed, using the probe-caught method, overall levels
of reported mind-wandering increased as a result of the inclusion
of atemporal mind-wandering. More importantly, the addition of
an atemporal response option clearly affected the distribution of
mind-wandering in both experiments, although this distribution
varied between experiments and was differentially related to age
in the two different paradigms.
Generally, when comparing across temporality conditions in
both experiments (i.e., considering only past and future mind-
wandering), a prospective bias was observed when the atemporal
option was unavailable. Notably, the current study extends these
findings to the SART. This is in line with previous work on tempo-
ral focus in mind-wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009b, 2011a,b;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al.,
2011, 2013; Song andWang, 2012), and reinforces the notion that
on relatively repetitive, simple tasks, the wandering mind tends to
prospect rather than retrospect. This may be related to the find-
ing that prospection requires relatively more cognitive resources
than retrospection, and future-focused mind-wandering during
low-demand tasks is a function of available resources (Smallwood
et al., 2009b). On the other hand, autobiographical thought may
inherently tend to focus on the future (Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Smallwood et al., 2011a,b). These trends, however, must be
considered in context of the atemporal response option.
In the self-caught version of the task (Experiment 1), when
participants were given the option to classify their mind-
wandering atemporally, the prospective bias disappeared. This
suggests that participants may be more likely to classify atemporal
mind-wandering as future-oriented as opposed to past-oriented,
when not allowed to use an atemporal option. This is an impor-
tant methodological issue (as we discuss below in the final section
of this Discussion), as well as a theoretically interesting finding
because it could be interpreted as some ambiguity on the par-
ticipants’ part regarding atemporal vs. future mind-wandering.
That is, participants may conflate uncertainty in temporal focus
with uncertainty about future events, and disproportionately clas-
sify atemporal mind-wandering as future-focused in a past/future
forced-choice paradigm. It is also important to note that when
the atemporal option was available, participants used it as least
as often as the past and future options, indicating that atem-
poral mind-wandering represents a significant amount of task-
unrelated thought.
It is unclear why the prospective bias was eliminated by inclu-
sion of the atemporal option in self-caught mind-wandering
(Experiment 1) but persisted somewhat in probe-caught mind-
wandering (Experiment 2). Smallwood et al. (2009b) reported
that the prospective bias in mind-wandering decreased as indi-
viduals found the task more challenging or engaging. Although
there were no differences between no-atemporal and atemporal
groups in difficulty or interest of the task as a whole, it is possi-
ble that the additional report option in the atemporal condition
increased SART difficulty in such a way that a prospective bias
was neutralized. Another possibility may concern task differences
in sensitivity to zone outs, or mind-wandering without awareness
(Schooler et al., 2004). The participant must necessarily initiate
self-reports of mind-wandering in Experiment 1, whereas with
probe-caught reports in Experiment 2mind-wandering may be
measured before an individual notices it. It is possible that tem-
poral mind-wandering—perhaps especially prospective mind-
wandering—may bemore likely to occur during periods when the
mind wanders without awareness. Because self-report and probe-
report methods are correlated but not isomorphic (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Sayette et al., 2009), there may be differences
in awareness of temporal mind-wandering, due to differences in
online self-monitoring. When self-monitoring requirements are
low, as in Experiment 2, participants are able to report mind-
wandering without awareness. Perhaps mind-wandering without
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awareness is more likely to be temporally, or even prospectively,
focused.
On the other hand, meta-awareness of mind-wandering may
influence thought reports of temporality, which may partly
explain the difference between the self-caught and probe-caught
experiments reported here.1Under the self-caught condition, par-
ticipants must maintain meta-awareness of their internal state,
but run the risk of reporting the contents of meta-awareness
itself, rather than the contents of conscious thought. If meta-
awareness serves as a kind of cognitive monitor, then it is likely
atemporal in nature, which may explain why the prospective bias
in temporal mind-wandering was eliminated in Experiment 1.
In the probe-caught condition (Experiment 2), meta-awareness
may be somewhat less of a factor, given that the opportunity
to provide thought reports is initiated by the experiment rather
than the participant. Due to a relatively small number of thought
reports/probes in each experiment, the current experiment can-
not determine whether atemporal mind-wandering is an effect of
meta-awareness, but perhaps detailed investigation into the cog-
nitive consequences of each type of thought report (e.g., their
impact on RT and accuracy in the SART task) may shed light on
this possibility.
The inclusion of the atemporal condition in our analy-
ses eliminated the prospective focus in mind-wandering in
both experiments, however, at least when considered against
the atemporal report option. Although there was an interac-
tion with age (see next section), participants reported no more
future-oriented mind-wandering relative to atemporal mind-
wandering. These results suggest that participants may indeed
be influenced by aspects of task design, such as the presence
or absence of an atemporal option when reporting temporal
mind-wandering. Therefore, careful understanding and charac-
terization of response possibilities is needed when examining
the extant literature on temporal focus in mind-wandering, as
well as in designing future studies on the phenomenology of
task-unrelated thought.
In Experiment 2, we also considered individual differences
that may play a role in mind-wandering. We found that overall
reports of mind-wandering were positively correlated with years
of education, which may reflect lower task engagement for better-
educated individuals. We also found that mind-wandering corre-
lated negatively with age as a continuous variable, which provides
an important validation for the group-level findings reported here
and elsewhere (e.g., Jackson and Balota, 2012).More interestingly,
there were differences in how each temporal option correlated
with these individual-difference measures. Future-focused mind-
wandering did not relate to any of our measures, but retrospective
mind-wandering was negatively associated with subjective health
and positively associated with neuroticism. Moreover, controlling
for age-related differences in neuroticism attenuated, but did not
eliminate, the association between retrospective mind-wandering
and subjective health (r = −0.19). This correlation suggests that
the relationship between mind-wandering and self-rated health
is independent of individual differences in personality traits
1We thank an reviewer for raising this possibility.
such as anxiety. Interestingly, negative states (Smallwood et al.,
2009a; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Berman et al., 2011)
or traits (Smallwood et al., 2007b) are themselves associated
with increased mind-wandering. In particular, rumination, or
repetitive negative thought about past events, may be more com-
mon in individuals who are prone to mind-wander. Indeed,
Smallwood and O’Connor (2011) reported that both retrospec-
tive questionnaires and online thought probes reflected increased
retrospective focus in participants experiencing a negative mood.
Additionally, Smallwood and O’Connor found that past-focused
mind-wandering increased positively with endorsements of items
on a depression inventory. It is possible, then, that temporal focus
in mind-wandering, like overall reporting of mind-wandering,
may be affected by mood and personality.
An interesting pattern that emerged from the accuracy and
RT data was that inclusion of the atemporal option for mind-
wandering reports also affected performance on the SART.
Participants in the atemporal condition were more accurate and
faster than participants without the atemporal response option,
and showed less pre-error speeding. Although these differences
were unexpected, it is possible that these differences reflect greater
task engagement when participants were given the atemporal
mind-wandering response option. This suggests the intriguing
possibility that participants are more closely monitoring their
engagement in the task when they are instructed to distinguish
between on-task thought and stimulus-independent thought
occurring in the present.
Although the current design made use of the SART rather
than a reading task or working memory task as Smallwood et al.
(2009b), the results reported here largely replicated their initial
study. This suggests that the prospective bias often reported in
the temporally-focused studies of mind-wandering may be influ-
enced by available response options and how those options are
defined. With the exception of the atemporal response option we
used the same response options as Smallwood et al. (2009b). It
is possible that there may be discrepancies between how differ-
ent participants interpret the past, atemporal, and future mind-
wandering response options. For example, if participants found
themselves thinking specifically about a grocery list, the eventmay
be categorized as “atemporal,” since thinking about a list itself
contains no temporal context, or as “future,” since the list refers to
a prospective intention. Although instructions were included on
how to differentiate these thoughts, we avoided providing specific
examples to allow participants greater freedom in responding.
This design may have caused participants to report atemporal
events idiosyncratically. Ultimately, these results demonstrate that
it is somewhat difficult to anticipate how participants interpret
response options, so future work must strike a balance between
defining a finite number of clear response options, and provid-
ing a set of options that encompasses the whole range of possible
off-task experiences.
Given that the current results demonstrated the importance
of response option in temporal reports of mind-wandering, it
is important to note that we did not include provisions for
separately reporting distractions due to the environment vs. task-
related interference, as in other studies (e.g., Stawarczyk et al.,
2011, 2013). To focus our design on one specific question, we
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were careful to replicate Smallwood et al. (2009a,b) as closely as
possible, changing only the “on task/here and now” report option
to highlight the effects of separating these two categories. It is pos-
sible that some participants reported task-related distractions and
interference as atemporal mind-wandering, which may inflate
the proportion of these reports. However, proportion of atem-
poral focus in mind-wandering varies between 11 and 22% in the
extant literature (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011, 2013; Song andWang, 2012). Importantly,
Stawarczyk et al. (2011, 2013) found atemporal mind-wandering
in approximately the same proportion as past and present tempo-
ral orientations, suggesting that any atemporal mind-wandering
still remains a significant portion of task-unrelated thought, and
cannot be accounted for by task-related interference. Naturally,
future work will need to explore the methodological concerns of
thought report through more complex manipulations, including
the assessment of mind-wandering separately from environmen-
tal distractions and task-related interference.
MIND-WANDERING AND AGING
Amajor goal of the present study was to replicate and extend find-
ings reported in Jackson and Balota (2012) and elsewhere (Singer
and McCraven, 1961; Giambra, 1973, 1989, 2000; Grodsky and
Giambra, 1990–1991;Maillet and Rajah, 2013); namely to explore
age differences in mind-wandering, and determine the role of
temporal focus in these differences. Although our samples were
closer in age than those reported in Jackson and Balota, older
adults still reported fewer instances of mind-wandering relative to
younger adults in both of the mind-wandering paradigms (self-
caught and probe-report) used in the present study. This may
be attributable to older adults finding the SART more difficult
(in both paradigms) and more interesting (in the probe-caught
paradigm, Experiment 2) than younger adults, an effect that has
been demonstrated to reduce reports of mind-wandering (Kane
et al., 2007; McVay et al., 2009). Group differences in personal-
ity may have played a role in reports of mind-wandering, since
older adults reported numerically lower scores on neuroticism
and higher scores in conscientiousness compared with younger
adults, with neuroticism linked to an increased likelihood to
mind-wander (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011) and age differ-
ences in conscientiousness perhaps linked to SART performance
and thought reports (Jackson and Balota, 2012). As suggested
in Jackson and Balota (2012), age differences in difficulty and
interest may have resulted in more effort, and therefore less
mind-wandering, by the older participants in our study.
When considered along with SART performance data, the
mind-wandering data present an interesting pattern of results.
Older adults demonstrated disproportionate pre-error speeding,
No-Go errors, and post-error slowing that were all maintained
after converting the data to within-subject z scores. Because z
score transformation corrects for the slowing of RTs associated
with aging (Faust et al., 1999), age effects observed in z scores sug-
gest a phenomenon over and above those expected with general
slowing. As discussed in Jackson and Balota (2012), dispropor-
tionate post-error slowingmay reflect a redirection of attention to
the primary task (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004;
Cheyne et al., 2009; Dutilh et al., 2012; although see Notebaert
et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2009b). Currently, it is unclear
whether post-error slowing reflects error detection and reinstate-
ment of the task set (Cheyne et al., 2009; Dutilh et al., 2012) or
instead a type of reflective, task-related mind-wandering, often
referred to as task-related interference (McVay and Kane, 2009;
Notebaert et al., 2009). Of course, these possibilities are not
mutually exclusive, and both accounts may contribute to the
disproportionate age-related post-error slowing.
Fewer reports of mind-wandering along with increased post-
error slowing and fewer No-Go errors seem to indicate greater
task engagement by older adults. However, increased pre-error
speeding by older adults raises the possibility that the task set
at times was not being well-maintained by this group. Pre-error
speeding suggests an automatic or otherwise disengaged response
to task stimuli. Although older adults were less likely to com-
mit No-Go errors than were younger adults, increased pre-error
speeding signals greater disengagement from the task immedi-
ately before the error. It is possible that the disproportionate
pre-error speeding in older adults may reflect a higher thresh-
old for mind-wandering before an error is produced, which once
more may be related to their relatively greater task engagement. In
this light, pre-error speeding and post-error slowing may there-
fore be coupled with older adults needing relatively more time
to re-engage the task set after their relatively rare errors, due to
a poorer task set compared with younger adults. Recent work by
Jackson and Balota (2013) supports this claim, where older adults
were less able to inhibit prepotent responses in Stroop paradigms,
while younger adults were able to minimize or eliminate Stroop
interference.
Turning to the temporal focus data, older adults showed
very similar patterns to younger adults, although there were
some differences across experiments. In the self-caught paradigm
(Experiment 1), both younger and older adults tended to selec-
tively report fewer instances of prospective mind-wandering
when given the atemporal option, thus eliminating that over-
all prospective bias. However, in the probe-caught version of
the task (Experiment 2), when given the atemporal response
option, older adults showed a different pattern across the three
temporal-response options. That is, they specifically reported
less past-oriented mind-wandering, over and above the general
reduction in mind-wandering observed in older adults relative to
younger adults. Despite the differences in prospective and retro-
spective orientation, these data are consistent with the idea that
older adults may be less likely to imagine episodic details that
are tied to a particular temporal epoch, compared with imagin-
ing an atemporal scenario (Rendell et al., 2012). It is particularly
striking that we found a negative correlation between age and
past-oriented mind-wandering, at the same time as a positive
correlation between age and atemporal mind-wandering when
treating age as a continuous variable. Therefore, as noted in the
previous section, there may be age differences in how mind-
wandering events are categorized, particularly when the event
lacks a clear temporal focus. Indeed, when examining only the
atemporal condition, younger adults reported statistically equiv-
alent proportions of atemporal and future-oriented, while older
adults reported proportionally more atemporal mind-wandering
relative to future-oriented mind-wandering.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 742 | 13
Jackson et al. Atemporal focus in mind-wandering
Additional hints as to why older adults might tend to be less
past-focused in particular can also be found in our exploratory
correlational analyses, where we found that neuroticism was
positively correlated with retrospective mind-wandering, as well
as subjective health being negatively correlated with retrospec-
tive mind-wandering, even when controlling for neuroticism.
Moreover, there is some evidence that negative mood is associated
with rumination (Smallwood et al., 2007b, 2009a; Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010; Berman et al., 2011). This is broadly consistent
with the literature showing that older adults are more positively
focused than younger adults (e.g., Charles et al., 2003), and thus
may focus on the “here and now” relative to the future or past.
The exploration of aging in EFT may shed light on the
organization of temporal focus in mind-wandering. Given age
differences that have been reported in temporal focus in auto-
biographical memory, it is possible that older adults may be
less inclined or less able to engage in temporally-oriented mind-
wandering relative to younger adults. Spreng and Levine (2006)
found age differences in the temporal distance of prospective
and retrospective simulation of autobiographical events. Younger
adults tended to prospect further into the future, while older
adults delved further into the past, presumably because older
adults have more retrospective events to consider. More recently,
Rendell et al. (2012) found age differences in autobiographi-
cal recall of future and atemporal events. Younger and older
adults constructed a future simulation, an atemporal scenario,
and a non-temporal event involving navigation. Although older
adults were relatively impaired on all three conditions relative to
younger adults, they were particularly disadvantaged on future-
event generation across several indicators of salience, quality,
and content. Although Rendell et al. (2012) did not exam-
ine retrospective memory, the age differences observed may
extend to a mind-wandering paradigm, partially accounting for
increased atemporal reports from older adults. Addis et al. (2008)
instructed younger and older adults to construct autobiograph-
ical events in the near and distant future, as well as to recall
autobiographical events from the near and distant past. The
authors found a high correlation between the quality of descrip-
tions for past and future events. As in Rendell et al. (2012),
older adults generated fewer episodic details for both temporal
epochs relative to younger adults (see also Addis et al., 2011).
Moreover, a measure of explicit memory administered to older
adults was associated with the number of details given for past
and future events. These studies, considered with the present
results, suggest that there may be some similarities between the
intentional simulation of autobiographical events and mind-
wandering episodes.
These results are broadly consistent with major theories of
mind-wandering. Both the Control Failures × Current Concerns
framework (McVay and Kane, 2010) and Smallwood’s (2010)
Global Availability hypothesis suggest that older adults should
report less mind-wandering, albeit through somewhat different
mechanisms. McVay and Kane have argued that older adults’
current concerns are less likely to be triggered due to the
novel environment of a testing room in a university setting,
while this environment is likely to activate concerns in younger
adults and may partially account for age differences in reported
mind-wandering. Importantly, this suggestion has beenmitigated
by the current study, given that all participants took part in
the task online in the environment of their own choice, thus
presumably equating environment familiarity across age groups.
Indeed, the data reported here directly replicate laboratory studies
of age-related differences in mind-wandering in an online set-
ting (Giambra, 1989; Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–1991; Jackson
and Balota, 2012), which demonstrates a critical extension of the
paradigm from the laboratory to a more naturalistic environ-
ment. Of course, it is still possible that there are age-related differ-
ences in current concerns that are not triggered by the immediate
context. On the other hand, control failures, as evidenced by
breakdowns in attentional control, are well-documented in older
adults (Spieler et al., 1996, 2000; Hasher et al., 2000; Faust and
Balota, 2007). Older adults demonstrated disproportionate pre-
error speeding, No-Go error response latencies, and post-error
slowing in the SART after correcting for general slowing in these
tasks. If older adults’ control failures render them less able to
report mind-wandering as it occurs, then the Control Failures ×
Current Concerns hypothesis may satisfactorily account for the
data observed here.
Finally, and importantly, the current findings replicate and
extend those reported by Jackson and Balota (2012), in addi-
tion to conceptually replicating aging work by other laborato-
ries (Giambra, 1989; Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–1991; Maillet
and Rajah, 2013). This is important because older adults’ rel-
atively infrequent reports of mind-wandering may have been
attributable to a novel laboratory testing environment where few
relevant concerns, and thus little mind-wandering, were triggered
(Klinger, 1971, 2009; McVay and Kane, 2010). The use of an
online sample in these experiments demonstrates a critical exten-
sion of lab-based findings regarding age-related changes to more
natural settings, where current concerns should be triggered for
both younger and older adults at a relatively equivalent rate. The
Mturk platform allowed all participants to choose the time and
location for their participation, and thus mitigates concerns that
previously reported age differences in reported mind-wandering
were due to contextual factors, rather than inherent group dif-
ferences. While there may still be age differences in triggered
current concerns, it appears that a laboratory environment does
not unduly exacerbate these effects.
It is also important to note that under the Mturk paradigm
we were not able to collect participant information on history of
psychiatric and neurological disorders or dementia, and collected
little in the way of demographics in Experiment 1. Thus, the data
may not reflect a wholly cognitively-normal sample, particularly
with regard to the older adult participants. However, given that
all participants included in the analyses maintained a minimum
level of accuracy on the SART, and the similarity in SART perfor-
mance between groups in Experiments 1 and 2, it is likely that our
omission of these variables did not significantly affect the current
results.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the present set of experiments demonstrates
the importance of introducing an atemporal response option
on reports of mind-wandering, and replicates and extends
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established effects of aging in mind-wandering in an online set-
ting. It appears that participants conflate on-task thought with
atemporal mind-wandering, with options such as “Task/Here and
Now” (Smallwood et al., 2009b), which may imply that all atem-
poral mind-wandering is task-related. In fact, our results show
that reports of being on-task fell from 76 to 63% when the atem-
poral option was introduced. In addition, the introduction of
the atemporal option differentially affected the self-caught vs.
the probe-caught mind-wandering paradigms. In the self-caught
version of the task, the atemporal option negated the future
bias, whereas in the probe-caught version, the atemporal option
revealed differences between age groups. Future research into the
temporal nature of mind-wandering should include an atemporal
mind-wandering option.
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